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Abstract 
A method of ranking the quality of applicants and acceptances to UK Higher Education 
establishments is developed.  Quality is measured by a weighted average of 
qualifications, whereby different qualifications can be compared by their success in 
generating a Higher Education place.  A theory is developed to justify this weighting 
procedure and is based on the idea that more able applicants will self-select into more 
difficult subject choices, which offer higher returns.  Choices are made prior to 
examination results being known, so high ability applicants may still be rejected.  The 
relative quality of applicants and acceptances across 170 separate subject groups is then 
devised and discussed.   
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I Introduction 
The Universities College Admissions Service (UCAS) processes undergraduate 
applications for around 300 Higher Education (HE) establishments spread throughout the 
United Kingdom, ranging from the most prestigious institutions, such as Oxford and 
Cambridge universities, to the more obscure.  Full-time undergraduate applicants do not 
approach HE colleges directly, rather they are required to apply via UCAS.
1
   Around 
42,000 separate courses are covered, which are split into 170 broad subject groups.  Over 
the five-year period 1996-2000, there were nearly two million home based (UK 
domiciled) applicants to HE who went through the UCAS application system.  The 
qualifications of these applicants are also tracked by UCAS.  So this provides a huge 
databank of information about subject choices and the qualifications of applicants.  The 
purpose is to use this information to understand which subjects attract the best qualified 
students and which subjects attract the less well-qualified.   
 
Such an exercise is not only of interest in itself – comparing the quality of academic 
establishments and subject groups, either formally or informally, is a popular pastime 
among educationalists.  But there are more substantial reasons other than the `beauty 
contest’ interest factor.  Endogenous growth theory has at its core the view that human 
capital provides an important external benefit generating growth, but this externality is 
likely to be subject specific (see Romer, 1994).  Some subjects (e.g. Engineering and 
Computer Science) might be better able to generate additional GNP compared with more 
purely academic subject choices.  Elias (1999, p. 7) shows that there are considerable 
variations in unemployment among recent graduates depending on subject choice.  More 
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applied subjects such as Engineering have less than half the unemployment rate compared 
with Natural Science graduates.  So which subject groups attract the best students?  Do 
the brightest and the best opt for subjects with higher potential positive spillovers?
2
   
Having comparative information about student quality is an important first step in any 
policy driven education strategy that seeks to align student choices with social goals. 
 
Each UCAS applicant is recorded with one of 19 separate qualifications (see Table 1).  
The key issue is how to devise a standard of comparison across these different 
qualifications, which is objective rather than a ranking based on subjective judgement.  It 
may be reasonable to assert that a 30 point A-level score is a better qualification level 
than a lower point A-level score, but how can a BTEC Merit qualification be compared 
with an A-level and so on?   A method for making such a comparison is developed and 
this is then used to devise a scale by which subjects can be ranked in terms of the quality 
of applicants and the quality of those that are accepted.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the mechanics of the UCAS 
admissions system and Section 3 describes the UCAS data in more detail.  Section 4 
explains the theory that underpins the ranking method, which also has a strong intuitive 
appeal.  It is based on the idea qualifications can be ranked according to the success with 
which they can convert applicants into acceptances.  Overall 76.7 % of applicants were 
successful over the five-year period of this study, but there are large differences across 
the 19 qualification levels.   Section 5 presents and discusses the results based on the 
ranking method. 
                                                                                                                                                  
1
 www.ucas.ac.uk  is a central resource for detailed information about UCAS.  The data used in this study 
are available from this source. 
2
 Blundell et al.  (1997)  surveys  UK graduate earnings and employment prospects. 
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2 The UCAS system 
From the mid 1980s, HE in the UK experienced a rapid expansion. Between 1983-84 and 
1993-94, there was a 67% growth among full-time undergraduates. After this, growth 
slowed, with total student numbers increasing by 6% between 1996-97 and 2000-01. The 
main cause of this expansion was the growth in the number of 18-21 year olds taking 
university courses.  The age participation index rose from 15% in 1983-84 to 30% in 
1993-94.  HEFCE (2001) suggests a number of reasons for the growth in student numbers. 
First, the introduction of the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1988 
(normally taken by students at age 16) improved the staying-on rate after compulsory 
schooling, through an increase in academic attainment at 16 (see also McIntosh, 2001, 
McVicar and Rice, 2001). In 2001 the government set an ambitious target of 50% 
participation for the 18-30 age group by 2010.    
 
Against this background of a generally buoyant demand for undergraduate HE, Figure (1) 
gives a schematic picture of how a typical applicant is processed through the UCAS 
system.  The model described in Section 4 abstracts the essential elements of this 
complex process.  The key point is that applicants do not apply directly to the HE 
institutions, but must do so via the centralized UCAS system.
3
  With the academic term 
commencing around late September, the first deadline occurs the previous January (exact 
dates are announced annually).    Each applicant is permitted to make up to six 
applications (except in Medicine, which is restricted to four).  Usually these six 
applications are in a well-defined subject area, but need not be so. In this case  the 
                                                 
3
 This refers to full-time undergraduates.  Part-time students and postgraduates apply directly to specific 
institutions.  Consequently the Open University, the largest provider of part-time education with no 
entrance requirements, is excluded from UCAS. 
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applicant is described as being in `no preferred subject area’ and the applicant will be 
assigned to a specific subject if the application is subsequently successful.  Around 20% 
of applicants are in this category and this is one reason why some subjects will appear to 
have more acceptances than applicants.   
 
These applications are then reviewed by the institutions and rejections or offers are made. 
Offers will typically be conditional on the achievement of some prescribed entry 
standard.  The majority of offers are conditional because most applicants will not know 
the results of exams until around August.  The model will seek to describe the choice 
problem of this typical applicant.  Applicants are obliged to choose a maximum of two 
from these conditional offers – assuming that the applicant is not rejected outright at this 
stage.   
 
Applicants and their educational establishments have good knowledge about the relative 
quality of subject/institution choices.  There is a well-defined pecking order among the 
various HE institutions, with correspondingly varying entry standards.
4
  Subjects also 
vary in entry standards, with certain subjects such as Medicine having high entrance 
standards, whereas combination subjects tend to have lower standards.  The typical 
applicant will tend, therefore, to keep one `high’ first choice offer at a better institution 
and a  `low’ insurance offer at a less prestigious institution.   
 
So applicants have a fairly sophisticated game to play.  It can be safely assumed that they 
will have a fairly accurate idea of the entry tariff required when they apply for a particular 
                                                 
4
 See Abbott and Leslie (2001), which reviews relative institutional quality among the top 97 institutions, 
which account for the majority of applications.   Some newspapers, for example, the Sunday Times and the 
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course/institution.  What they will not know is the outcome of their exams, but most will 
have a fair idea of how they are likely to perform.  So students who expect to do well will 
opt for the more difficult choices, which offer higher returns, and students who expect to 
do less well will opt for lower entry tariff courses at less prestigious institutions.  The 
consequence is that it can easily turn out that one student with a better grade than another 
will be rejected at this stage and the student with the inferior result will be accepted.  It is 
this somewhat fuzzy success/failure entrance standard that will be at the heart of the 
method of determining which subjects attract the best qualified students. 
 
For applicants rejected at this stage, all is not lost.  A process known as clearing then 
comes into to play (and a small number of late registrants who do not enter the initial 
stage of the annual round can come in at the clearing stage).
5
   Clearing operates from 
around the end of August until courses commence, although in practice the majority of 
clearing takes place in a brief two week window from the point that results are 
announced.   
 
Among the 42,000 courses offered many would not have filled their target numbers from 
applicants in the first stage.  These will then advertise vacancies (this information is 
widely disseminated in newspapers and the Web).  Students can then directly contact 
these institutions to see if their exam grades meet the entry tariff for that course.  UCAS 
will then record the applicant as accepted if he or she is successful at this late stage.  
20.5% of acceptances came through clearing and late registrations during 1996-2000 
admission rounds.   
                                                                                                                                                  
Financial Times publish annual rankings and these results are widely disseminated.  The FT ranking can be 
found at http://specials.ft.com/universities2001/index.html. 
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One would think that clearing should `mop up’ all the better-qualified applicants but this 
turns out not to be the case.  A significant proportion of very well-qualified applicants 
will turn out not to be accepted.  The reason is that such applicants may well feel that the 
less prestigious courses on offer at clearing are simply not good enough, given their 
qualifications and prefer to sit out for another year or not bother at all.  Or they may 
simply become disheartened and give up.  Clearing has an associated stigma with students 
and institutions alike keen to avoid it if possible.  Less well-qualified applicants might be 
grateful for any opportunity at HE.  The process of clearing is another reason why some 
subjects (these are usually among the least prestigious) will appear to have more 
acceptances than applications.  Those accepted through clearing may have to settle for an 
alternative subject choice.  It also means that some subjects might turn out to have a 
lower quality of acceptances compared with its applicants, which is not what one would 
expect. 
 
There is one fairly sophisticated strategy that the really determined applicant can make to 
avoid the restrictions of the UCAS system, which fig. (1) describes.  This is to be released 
from a conditional offer once results are known.  This practice, if it became widespread, 
would undermine the model somewhat.  Fortunately, it is rare but the practice has 
increased in recent times.  Expansion of HE means that far more courses are entered into 
clearing and the associated institutions will drop their entry tariff in order to fill places.   
Students who meet the standard of at least one of their conditional offers now observe 
that they could actually be accepted into what they believe to be a more prestigious 
course/institution, if only they could only enter clearing!  So some smart students request 
                                                                                                                                                  
5
 Late registrants are  at a disadvantage, because popular courses will be full at this stage.  There is, 
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to be released from the offer. Such is the competition among HE institutions for good 
students nowadays, they will encourage students to break these contracts in order to fulfill 
their student quotas.   Fair play among British academics is declining, it has to be said. 
 
In summary, therefore, the whole UCAS process is complicated and the wide diversity of 
outcomes among qualification levels is unsurprising.  It is not a simple matter of pass and 
fail – with those above the line entering HE and the rest rejected.  
3 The UCAS data. 
 
The ranking is based on an analysis of home-based applicants over a five-year period 
from 1996-2000, giving 1,930,582 individual observations.
6
  The data cover 21 broad 
subject areas, which are then further divided into 170 specific subject groups.  It should 
be emphasized that individual subjects will be offered at many HE establishments with 
the entry tariff varying according to the prestige of the institution offering the course. So 
the aim is to devise an average quality measure of applicants and acceptances by subject, 
which is not institution specific. 
 
A second important distinction needs to be made.  Although HE represents the upper tier 
of post compulsory education in the UK, two broad types of education are offered in the 
HE sector.  The first type is degree level courses and the second broad type is Higher 
National Diploma (HND) courses.  These are less academic, normally taking one year 
less to complete,  and are more vocational in nature.  Around 8.6 % of admissions are to 
HND level courses and these are generally of a less demanding standard than degree level 
                                                                                                                                                  
therefore, an incentive to enter the competition at the earliest stage, which is what most applicants do. 
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courses.
7
  The entrance requirements are accordingly less demanding and a more limited 
range of subjects is covered – for example, Medicine and Dentistry can only be 
undertaken at degree level.   The quality measures will, therefore, distinguish two types of 
courses.  The top institutions do not offer HND level courses.   
 
Table 1 gives some key information about qualifications and success rates.  The overall 
acceptance rate for the five years covered can be seen from the last row to be 76.7%, but 
there is considerable variation around this depending on the type of qualification 
achieved.  The percentage of applicants with a particular qualification and that 
qualification’s success rate in generating an acceptance (this includes both degree level 
and HND level acceptances) are shown.  This ranges from a high of 94.4% for those with 
6 or more Highers and a low of 48.7% for those with 3 or fewer Highers. 
 
A-levels, shown in the first six rows, are the core qualification taken by 54.7% of 
applicants.  These are given a point score, with 30 representing the highest possible score.  
The typical applicant sits 3 A-levels.  There are five passing A-level grades, from A 
(highest) to E (lowest).    Grade A earns 10 points; B earns 8 down to E, which scores 2.      
 
It can be seen that success is very much linked to the point score, ranging from a below 
average 66% for those with 0-5 points to a very high 91.5% for 26-30 points.  Since a 
higher point score means a better qualification, this provides informal support for the 
view that the percentage success rate can be used as a means of comparing qualification 
quality.  The next four rows refer to `Highers’.   These are the Scottish equivalent of A-
                                                                                                                                                  
6
 These datasets can be found at www.ucas.ac.uk 
7
 11.3 % of Britain’s ethnic minority communities in HE enter HND level courses, compared with 7.5% of 
whites.  The differences between whites and the ethnic minority communities are explored in Leslie (2001). 
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levels because Scotland has always had a considerable degree of independence in the 
organization of its education.
8
  As with the traditional A-level, it can be seen that the 
acceptance rate works in the expected way; a greater number of Highers means a greater 
chance of acceptance.  Notice, however, that there is far from a 100% acceptance rate, 
even for those with the best qualifications among A-levels and Highers.   
 
Access/Foundation course are a miscellaneous group of qualifications usually taken by 
mature students in the FE sector without formal qualifications looking to enter the HE 
sector.   The Baccalaureate is an international qualification taken by 6185 of applicants 
over this data period.    BTEC and its Scottish equivalent SCOTVEC are vocational 
qualifications, usually offered within the Further Education sector and by employers. The 
three grades (distinction, merit, pass) of GNVQ (General National Vocational 
Qualifications) are distinguished – once again the better the GNVQ score, the better are 
the chances of success.  These are mainly vocation-related qualifications.  `Other’ refers 
to qualifications, which do not readily fit into any of the listed categories.
9
  
 
The final qualification is the  `none’ category.  At first sight an apparent success rate of 
70.6% seems somewhat implausible.  The reason is that the none category includes a lot 
of missing information, not only failures.   For example, late registrants do not always 
record the qualification actually achieved – only a minimal return is sent to UCAS for the 
purpose of record keeping.
10
   Subsequent analysis will include the none category as a 
qualification level in its own right.   
                                                 
8
 Scottish education goes for breadth rather than the traditional depth of the A-level.  Students sit a larger 
number of Highers.  A Scottish degree lasts four years, rather than the typical English three-year scheme. 
9
 Details  of specific qualifications are in UK Qualifications for Entry to Higher Education,   published 
annually by UCAS. See UCAS (2001), 
10
 Subsequently confirmed in conversations with Jim Wilkins of UCAS. 
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From 2002 onwards the traditional A-level will be replaced and UCAS is developing a 
method to compare all qualifications.  See UCAS (2000), where part of the purpose of the 
exercise is to widen access for those with less familiar (non A-level type) qualifications.  
A comparability scale is thought to make admissions tutors keener to offer places on the 
basis of a common tariff rather than relying on qualifications that are familiar and trusted.  
The UCAS method is, however, subjective, unlike the method of comparison developed 
here.  Here it is behaviour that measures quality – qualifications are ranked in quality 
according to their acceptance rate.  So, in effect, it is the behaviour of admissions tutors 
that is the acid test of a qualification’s worth.  It respects the  collective judgment of 
individual HE institutions to determine the relative worth of qualifications. 
 
4 Using qualification success rates as a measure of 
quality 
 
The idea that a particular qualification with a higher success rate (as measured by the 
proportion with that qualification obtaining an HE place, as shown in Table 1) is a better 
qualification compared with one with a lower success rate has a strong intuitive appeal.   
Nevertheless, a formal analysis is useful to see precisely how such a method can be 
justified in a situation where the entrance requirements of courses offer vary, as is the 
case in HE.  If qualifications were uni-dimensional (with marks arranged along a cardinal 
scale of 1-100 say) then the measurement problem to be addressed here would not arise.  
Qualifications could easily be ranked in this instance – where one would expect a positive 
monotonic relationship with acceptances.  The issue here is to devise a method of 
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comparing disparate qualifications, which cannot be easily compared.  Thus it may to 
reasonable to state that 26-30 A-level points is better than 5-10 points, but how can A-
levels be compared with BTEC as an example?   
 
The institutional structure of the UCAS system has already been described. It is not a case 
of there being one single standard that applicants must achieve to gain an acceptance.  
The 42,000 courses on offer all differ in the `tariff’, i.e. the minimum standard to gain 
acceptance.  For example, in Cambridge University entrants achieve an average A-level 
grade of 29.8 points, whereas entrants to Anglia Polytechnic University (also located in 
Cambridge) achieved an average grade of 11.2 points.
11
 
 
Suppose that the various courses on offer across the various institutions can be arranged 
along an entry standard scale denoted as c, where higher values of c indicate a higher 
standard. An applicant’s utility will be described by U(c, tastes), where U is a Von 
Neumann Morgenstern utility function. Tastes are exogenous and would reflect the 
applicant’s subject preferences.  So an applicant, who wants to study French, is unlikely 
to gain a high utility from Business Studies, even though c levels may be comparable.  
The assumption is that with 42,000 different courses on offer tastes are not so specific as 
to rule a wide range of possible choice options along the c scale.  Some applicants might 
additionally really want to study Medicine as an example, but have sufficient insight 
about their underlying ability that they opt for a more realistic choice such as a Nursing 
degree. 
 
                                                 
11
 Note this differs from the entry tariff, but it gives a fair indication of the large range in entry standards. 
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It is assumed that =
dc
dU
U’  > 0; thus a `tougher’ course (as measured by the entry 
standard c) provides greater utility (more prestige, higher potential earnings, better 
teaching etc).   0'' <U  indicates risk aversion and U’’ > 0 indicates risk loving behaviour 
in the usual way.
12
    An applicant will aim to choose a value for c that will maximize 
expected utility.   To reflect the institutional UCAS setting, applicants must choose c prior 
to the realization of their qualification level.   
 
It is clear that applicants do not make choices in a random way; rather, there is a 
considerable degree of self-selection in the application process.  No hopers do not bother 
to apply to Cambridge and those with little prospect of good A-levels will bother to apply 
for Medicine or other tough courses.  It will be seen later that there is a considerable 
correlation between applicant quality and acceptance quality, which largely (but not 
entirely) reflects this self-selection process.   
 
Assume  that the i
th
 applicant’s realized qualification level is composed of two parts 
iii vqz +=  (1) 
where qi is the applicant’s private information (or expectation) about his or her likely 
qualification level, which reflect factors such inherent ability, motivation and so on.   The 
actual grade zi is this part plus a random component with E(vi)  =  0.  The point is that zi is 
unobservable; the aim is to infer something about this cardinal scale from knowledge of 
the success rate of particular qualifications for which the comparison scale zi is a latent 
unobserved variable.  
                                                 
12
 An accessible account of the Von Neumann Morgernstern approach is given in Hey (1979, Chap. 4). 
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It follows that  
ii qzE =)(  (2) 
The applicant is required to choose a course (i.e. make a choice of c) prior to the 
realization of vi.  To highlight the key issues involved, it is initially assumed that the 
applicant can only make one choice.  Suppose that the entry standard for a particular 
course is c0.  The applicant’s expected grade, if successful,  will be the mean of the 
truncated distribution 
0| czEz ii ≥  (3) 
For an applicant with a given qi,  the probability of acceptance across the range of course 
choices will be decreasing in c.  Similarly for courses with the same entrance standard the 
probability of acceptance will be increasing in qi.  This probability relationship can be 
described by (dropping subscripts): 
  ),( cqpp =  (4) 
where 00 <
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
c
p
and
q
p
.  The actual outcome will then be determined by the 
realization of vi.   Thus c in eq.(4) refers to the entry standard and should be distinguished 
from eq.(3). The average grades achieved by successful applicants to a particular course 
would be expected to exceed the minimum entrance standard.   There are no tournament 
issues involved in the applicant’s choice strategy because only rarely would an HEI 
renege on an offer if the applicant meets the required standard.  Thus p is independent of 
the number of applicants to a particular course.  Popular courses will ration by setting a 
high value for c. 
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The objective is to establish the relationship between p and q.  From eq.(4) it can be seen 
that this is composed of two parts 
dq
dc
pp
dq
dp
cq *+=  (5) 
If it can be shown that 0>
dq
dp
 this will help establish the idea that the success rate of a 
particular qualification is a measure of its relative value.  The first task is to demonstrate 
that 0>
dq
dc
, that is that people who expect a high grade select into harder courses. 
Expected utility (V) is given by 
)()),(1(),(),( 0 qUcqptastescUcqpV −+=  (6) 
Lack of success implies a utility level of U0(q).  The idea here is that the no success utility 
may be increasing in q with 0
)( 0
≥
dq
Ud
.  A person with  top A-levels who is not 
successful (and Table 1 shows some of these exist) is probably better off with more 
options than someone with a set of much poorer qualifications who is also unsuccessful.  
However, this assumption is not critical to the analysis.     
 
The individual with a given q and a set of tastes , which are both known information to 
the applicant, will choose a course (i.e. a value of c) to maximise V.  This will satisfy: 
0')( 0 =+−= pUUUp
dc
dV
c  (7) 
The second-order condition requires that: 
0'''2)( 02
2
<=++−= GpUUpUUp
dc
Vd
ccc  (8) 
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Notice that this condition does not require the assumption of risk aversion, nor is pcc < 0 a 
requirement.  Equations (7) and (8) can be used to establish that: 
0
' '0
>
+−
=
G
UpUp
dq
dc cq
 (9) 
where it has been assumed that pqc  =  0  –  there seems no overwhelming reason that this 
cross-partial should exert any influence.  This then establishes the common-sense result 
(for which the empirical evidence is overwhelming – see the next section) that people 
with higher q apply courses with higher entrance standards.    
 
However, the key question is how high q people trade-off the desire for a better course 
against the fact that this might mean a lower probability of acceptance.  The 
commonsense view would be that individuals do a bit of both.  Thus if an applicant has a 
high innate q he or she will opt for a higher c but not choose c to be so high that it lessens 
the probability of acceptance.  However, it should also be commonsense that some 
individuals might not behave in this typical way and the model should not be so 
restrictive as to rule out idiosyncratic behaviour. 
 
Equation (5) is the starting point.  The relationship between the acceptance probability 
and q is composed of a direct part pq  which is >  0.  The second part is the indirect 
influence of q through the fact that it alters the choice of c.  This indirect effect works in 
the opposite direction (paradoxically if 
dq
dc
 had a perverse sign, then higher q would 
unambiguously be associated with a higher probability of acceptance).  So which effect is 
likely to dominate, the direct or the indirect?  It can be seen that: 
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      -  ±    ±           + 
 
G
UpUcqppUUppUpp
dq
dp cqccqcq
'
0
2
0 ''),()(' ++−+
=                           (10) 
 
where the possible signs of the four terms on the numerator are indicated above each 
term.  An overall positive effect requires the numerator to be negative.  It is not possible 
to sign eq.(10) unambiguously – so the formal analysis does not rule out the possibility 
that some among the more able seek out courses, which offer a lower acceptance 
probability.  Not surprisingly, risk aversion (U
’’
 <  0) would make 
dq
dp
 > 0 a more likely 
outcome.   
 
The sign of  pcc is ambiguous, but the following consideration suggests that this reinforces 
risk averse behaviour.  Think of the density function of zi in eq.(1).  This would be 
unimodal with a peak value at q.  With c < q, then pcc < 0 and when c > q then  pcc >  0.  
With c < q, the probability of acceptance is greater than 50%.  Given that the overall 
acceptance rate far exceeds 50%, the typical applicant appears to set c < q.  
 
The final term works against 0>
dq
dp
.  It reflects the fact that higher ability people face a 
lower failure penalty, which would encourage the choice of more difficult courses.  So the 
theory does not always rule out that some high ability applicants will have a lower 
probability of acceptance because of unusual preferences.  Empirical evidence, however,  
supports the idea that 
dq
dp
 is positive for the typical applicant.  A 26-30 point range in A-
levels  is a better score than 21-25 points and so on.  Table 1 shows that the acceptance 
proportion is monotonically increasing in the A-level point score, which supports the idea 
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that
dq
dp
 > 0 for the typical applicant.  Other self-contained qualification groupings 
(Highers and GNVQs) also behave in the same way.   Consequently,  
dq
dp
 > 0 is the most 
realistic behavioural assumption for the majority of applicants. 
 
So, if  the joint distribution of grades and the probability of acceptance across the whole 
population of applicants is considered in the light of the individual behavioural 
predictions of the model, looking  at eq.(2) it can see that there is a positive association 
between E(z)  and q, which is positively associated with p.
13
  The joint distribution of 
expected grades of all applicants and acceptance probabilities can be described by: 
0
|)(
>
dp
pzdE
 (11) 
However, the concern is the expected probability of acceptance for any given z.  Equation 
(11) says that a high z means a higher q is more likely, which in turn means a higher 
probability of acceptance.  Hence eq.(11) can be re-expressed as: 
0
|)(
>
dz
zpdE
 (12) 
Given that there is comprehensive data over a five year period, then to a very good 
approximation E(p) can be measured by the sample proportion of those successful for any 
given z value.
14
  The sample proportion acceptance rate for particular qualifications will 
be used as the indirect measure of z.    
 
                                                 
13
 Qualification data refer to all applicants, not just successful applicants.  However, it is easily seen from 
eq. (3) that E(z) for successful applicants will also be positively associated with q, given that c and q are 
positively correlated. 
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Each subject group (of which there are 170) is composed of many different courses across 
many institutions, each of which has its own entrance standard c.   Each subject will 
typically have a range of qualifications associated with its successful applicants. Recall 
also eq.(3), which shows that even if there was a common entrance standard across each 
subject, there would be a distribution of realized grades across each subject based on the 
truncated distribution.   
 
The quality measure is the weighted average of the qualification success rates.  Thus the 
quality measure for the jth subject is: 
i
i
ij pZ ∑
=
=
19
1
α  (13) 
where iα  is the relevant proportion among the 19 possible qualifications and ip  is the 
proportion who successfully gain an acceptance with the ith qualification level.  In effect, 
this weighting scheme assumes that there is a linear relationship between E(p)  and z  in 
eq.(12).   
 
The model has not captured all the complex institutional detail.  This is a one-shot 
experiment, whereas the UCAS system allows for several chances. (see fig.(1) once 
more).   However, it does capture the essential elements of the process.  With two 
chances, the first part of eq.(6) now has two parts, where the applicant must  choose a c1  
and a c2.   Intuition would suggest that c1 would be set somewhat higher than c and c2  
(the insurance choice) would be pitched somewhat below c.  This is what the model 
predicts and  can be demonstrated as follows.  With two chances V is modified to: 
                                                                                                                                                  
14
 Actually a slightly more sophisticated empirical measure can also  be used, but this turns out to be fairly 
close to the sample proportions. 
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)()),(1()()],(),([)(),( 0221211 qUqchcUqcpqchcUqcpV −+−+=  (14) 
Think of c1 as the higher tariff choice and c2  ( 21 cc ≥ ) as the lower tariff (insurance 
choice) and where h is the probability that the realized grade is ≥  c2.  Hence  
)],(),([ 12 qcpqch −  is the probability that the second choice outcome occurs.  The 
applicant chooses a c1 and a c2 to maximise V.    The signs on h are exactly the same as in 
the single choice problem. 
   
With two choices, one option is to choose two courses of equal difficulty, in which case 
),(),( 12 qcpqch −  now becomes zero, and the original problem shown by eq.(6) emerges 
once more.  But it is clear that the applicant can do better than this.  Keep c2  at the 
original choice of c,  when only one choice can be made.  The overall probability of 
acceptance cannot decline.  Now choose any c1  above c.  This is bound to offer a higher 
level of V  since there is a finite probability that the realization of z  will exceed c1.   
 
Pari Passu, a similar argument can be made about moves in the opposite direction.  Keep 
c1 at the original level c.  Clearly, setting c2 at any level below c must lead to an 
improvement in V.   So it has been seen that at the margin with the addition of one extra 
choice, the applicant gains by raising c1 above c and lowering c2   below c.   A wider 
choice means more optimistic bidding at the upper end (c1) and insurance behaviour at the 
lower end (c2).  Once more this result does not depend on risk aversion.   
  
In terms of establishing a relationship equivalent to eq.(10), the key probability is h.  
What matters is if either c1  or c2  occurs, not which.  Consequently, substitute h for p in 
eq.(5) and proceed as before.  An equation similar to eq.(10) emerges, where once more 
the sign is ambiguous for all the same reasons as in the single choice problem.  However, 
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for exactly the same reasons there is a strong presumption that the relationship is a 
positive one.  In summary, the two choice case adds some interesting detail, but the 
fundamental issues are similar to the single subject choice model. 
5 Ranking subjects 
 
Table 2 gives the ranking using the measure described by eq.(13) for 21 broad based  
subject groups.  For convenience the Z  measure of quality has been scaled between one 
(highest possible value) and zero.  A subject would be given a Z score of one if everyone 
had the top ranked qualification and zero if everyone had the bottom ranked qualification.  
The first column shows the ranking based on the average success rate of each 
qualification and the second column shows the ranking derived using an alternative 
method, which will be described shortly.    
 
The next column shows the subject group, and the letters associated with these broad 
subject groups are helpful to track the finer subject classifications of Table 3.  As an 
example one subject group in Table 3 is “NN Combinations”.  This refers to combination 
subjects within the “N Business and administrative studies” broad subject group. The first 
column after the subject group shows the qualification quality of those accepted onto 
degree level courses.  The next column shows the applicant quality.   The striking feature 
is the confirmation of the self-selection process at work as alluded to in Section 3.  There 
is a strong association with acceptance quality.  The correlation coefficient is 0.93.  If 
applicants did not self-select, a much more equal distribution in the quality of applicants 
across subjects would be expected, but this does not happen.  Some applicants will have 
known grades at the time of application and these would be expected to tailor their 
 21 
 
  
 
applications accordingly.  So some association between application quality and 
acceptance quality would be expected.  
 
The next column shows the quality of HND acceptances (Medicine/Dentistry is not 
offered at HND level).  It demonstrates the much lower quality of HND acceptances and 
confirms that the ranking method developed in Section 3 works in the expected way.  The 
highest rank HND group lies below the lowest ranked degree subject.   
 
The final column gives the application to acceptance ratio (recall that each applicant can 
make up to six applications, except Medicine which is restricted to four).   This provides 
further indirect support for the self-selection that goes on among applicants.  Suppose it 
was just a question of numbers.  Subjects that attracted the largest numbers of 
applications would be expected to have the highest acceptance quality, as they could be 
the most selective in rejection.  It is true that the top ranked subject group 
(Medicine/Dentistry) attracts the highest number of applications by far, but the correlation 
between acceptance quality and application/acceptance ratio is not particularly strong.  
This is 0.43, and when Medicine/Dentistry is excluded, this falls to 0.08.   The large 
number of applications to Medicine allows it to have the largest improvement in the 
quality of acceptances, relative to applications, but it also has the highest applicant 
quality, despite the larger number of applications.  So applicant quality is not a matter of 
numbers. 
 
The logit method of ranking is shown in column 2 and offers a different method for 
ranking subject quality. It enables a finer method of isolating the effect of qualifications 
on acceptances.  It may be that particular qualifications are correlated with certain other 
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characteristics, which the simple proportions method does not take into account.  For 
example, people who do well in examinations tend to come from `better’ schools.  So it 
may be that it is the school effect rather than the qualification that generates success and 
applicants from better schools but with less good qualifications have a corresponding 
better chance of success.  To overcome this a logit model that estimates the probability of 
acceptance is fitted where the controlling characteristics include social class, ethnicity, 
school background and time effects in addition to qualifications.  To isolate the 
qualification effect, the average probability of acceptance for each of the 19 qualification 
levels is calculated (this is just the sample proportions of acceptances in the case of a logit 
model).  The next stage is to predict the average probability of acceptance on the 
assumption that the qualification had no impact on the chance of acceptance – in other 
words it is the other characteristics alone that determine the probability of acceptance 
rate.  This value is then subtracted from the previous base run calculations, thus isolating 
the qualification effect.
15
   These numbers (again scaled to lie between zero and one) are 
then used in place of ip in eq.(13).  
 
There is, as it turns out, little difference in the two methods.  The correlation between 
columns 1 and 2 is 0.98.  What this demonstrates is that the admissions procedure to HE 
in the UK is a merit based system, where qualifications, not other characteristics, are the 
key determinant of success.  The logit model isolates the pure qualification effect from 
other characteristics, but other characteristics do not in fact exert much influence relative 
to qualifications. 
 
                                                 
15
 The logit results are not reported, but can be viewed at  
www.mmu.ac.uk/h-ss/eco/ppdl.htm 
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A further confirmation that the ranking method measures quality is to track degree results.  
People with better qualifications ought to achieve better results in their final degrees.   
This quality effect is present, but the issue is complicated by subject specific `custom and 
practice’ in the awarding of degrees.  The UK system ranks degrees according to the 
following five-point scale – first; upper second; lower second; third; pass; fail.  By 
convention a `good degree’ is regarded as achieving an upper second or first class 
honours.  Tables 2 and 3 have established that subjects definitely vary by the quality of 
their intake, so one might expect that  subjects with better qualified entrants would reveal 
more people with good degrees.  In fact this turns out not to be the case.
16
   There is a 
fairly wide variation in the proportion that achieve good degrees in particular subjects but 
this is not associated with the underlying quality of entrants.   So individual subjects tend 
to set their own benchmarks as to what constitutes a good degree.  What turns out to be 
the case is that within subject groups there is an association between the quality of 
entrants and the class of degree obtained.  This supports the view that admissions officers 
are reasonable discriminators of quality.   
 
So much then for the general issues raised by Table 2.   The final row shows the overall 
average scores, thus subject groups ranked  below 9 are the under-performers.  Combined 
sciences has an above average applicant quality, but below average acceptance quality, 
possibly a consequence of the small application to acceptance ratio.   The general pattern 
revealed at the broad subject level is somewhat reassuring in that it is not dominated by 
either Arts or Sciences – contrary to a certain `folk wisdom’ that the young are less 
interested in Science based subjects.  Leslie (2001), however, has shown that there 
different patterns across the ethnic communities in this respect.  The ethnic communities, 
                                                 
16
 See Leslie (2001) for a full discussion. 
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who comprise around 15% of entrants to HE, are more strongly attracted to non- Arts 
based subjects such as Medicine, Business Studies and Mathematics. 
 
Education emerges with a low score; it is perhaps disappointing that those entrusted with 
the production of new human capital should be relatively poorly endowed relative to 
other participants in HE.  However, this excludes PGCE students, which are those who 
undertake a teaching qualification after an undergraduate degree.  Finally, note that the 
`No preferred subject group’ attracts the lowest qualified applicants.  This result makes 
good sense.  It can be imagined that the least able will have the least commitment to HE 
and are unable to formulate a clear view as to a subject choice. 
 
Table 3 provides more detail for 170 separate subject groups.
17
  Among the general points 
to emerge are 
• Single subject  and combination degrees  seem to attract roughly the same quality 
of student, contrary to the view that single subject degrees are more popular 
choices.  The average rank for combination subjects (30 groups are distinguished 
overall) is 83.7.   This is good news for universities such as Keele and Sussex who 
espouse a philosophy of the combination approach.  However, there is an uneven 
performance among the combination subjects.  `Language Combinations’ is 
ranked 14. Physical Science alongside Mathematics and Social Science 
combinations also do well.     
• By contrast, specific subject choices attract the more able applicant within the 
various subject groups.  General Engineering ranks 148, whereas Chemical 
                                                 
17
 Note that some subjects, notably Archaeology, Geography and Psychology appear twice depending on 
whether the degree is Arts or Science orientated. 
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Engineering ranks 16.  In many subject groups it is the `Other’ non-specific 
categories that attract the least able students. 
• Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Science attract some of the most able 
students.  These might be broadly described as  part of the `caring for’ 
professions.  Other similar subjects fare less well – the low performance of 
Education has already been noted.  Nursing is ranked 157 and Social Work is the 
lowest ranked of all subjects.  Unlike these other professions, Social Work is not 
regarded as a particularly prestigious job. 
• Within the broad subject groups, it is pure subjects rather than the applied subjects 
that emerge best.  For example, Physics ranks 12, whereas Environmental 
Sciences ranks 115.  Mathematics ranks 8, whereas Computer Science ranks 129 
and so on.   
• Contrary to conventional wisdom that Law attracts some of the most able 
students, its ranking is 45.   Economics (within the same broad subject group) 
ranks 22 and Sociology manages only a lowly 122.  Economics attracts far more 
able students compared with Business Studies.  The highest ranked among that 
group is Financial Management at 68. 
6 Concluding comments 
 
UCAS splits applicants into 170 separate subject groups.  By exploring the qualifications 
of applicants and acceptances, these subject groups were ranked according to the quality 
of qualifications.  The method was based on an expected utility maximisation model, 
whereby applicants self-select into various course options.  Better students will choose 
courses with higher entrance standards, and this was combined with the behavioural 
assumption that better students will additionally seek courses with a higher probability of 
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acceptance.   From this it followed that qualifications could be ranked according to the 
proportion accepted into HE.   The ranking method gave plausible results, with applicants 
having a lower quality than acceptances, and non-degree level HE courses a much lower 
rank than degree level courses.   
 
 So what are the overall lessons from this ranking exercise?   What emerges most strongly 
is diversity.   Good students appear to spread themselves a wide range of subjects, with no 
obvious bias towards the Arts or Sciences.  Perhaps, in the final analysis, this diversity is 
symptomatic of the generally robust health of the British Higher Education system.
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Table 1 
Qualifications among applicants (1996-2000) 
Qualification 
% of applicants 
with this 
qualification 
% accepted 
with this 
qualification 
   
  0  to  5 A level  pts 1.1 66.0 
  10 to  6  A level  pts 9.2 74.7 
  15 to 11  A level pts 9.1 81.9 
  20 to 16  A level pts 14.1 87.0 
  25 to 21  A level pts 8.9 89.6 
  30 to 26  A level pts 12.3 91.5 
  3 or fewer Highers 1.2 48.7 
  4 Highers 1.1 79.2 
  5 Highers 1.5 88.1 
  6 or more Highers 1.6 94.4 
  Access/Foundation 6.3 67.8 
  BTEC/SCOTVEC 9.9 67.5 
  Baccalaureate 0.3 74.1 
  Deg/Partial Degree 1.4 53.0 
  GNVQ Pass 3.8 53.4 
  GNVQ Merit 2.5 78.4 
  GNVQ Distinction 1.7 83.6 
  Other Qualification 7.6 53.5 
  None 6.5 70.6 
   
All Qualifications 100 76.7 
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Table 3 
Ranking of all subject groups (degree level) 
Rank 
Logit 
Rank Subject 
Degree 
Accept 
Quality 
Application 
Quality 
Numbers 
accepted 
      
      
1 2 A2 Pre-clinical dentistry    0.880 0.772 4039 
2 1 Q8 Classics    0.868 0.856 3481 
3 5 A1 Pre-clinical medicine    0.865 0.779 23831 
4 3 Q9 Other ancient languages    0.856 0.512 161 
5 4 T9 Other or unspecified modern languages    0.853 0.810 4729 
6 6 Q6 Latin    0.842 0.784 74 
7 12 D1 Veterinary science    0.840 0.803 2645 
8 7 G1 Mathematics    0.827 0.822 19196 
9 13 C4 Genetics    0.823 0.761 2244 
10 14 B3 Pharmacy    0.823 0.692 8071 
11 8 L8 Geography (see also F8)    0.816 0.811 13248 
12 16 F3 Physics    0.813 0.811 13481 
13 9 R1 French    0.812 0.781 4210 
14 10 QRT Combinations    0.812 0.813 19178 
15 17 C7 Biochemistry    0.806 0.766 8541 
16 28 H8 Chemical engineering    0.804 0.788 4320 
17 11 R5 Portuguese    0.802 0.445 6 
18 15 V3 Economic and social history    0.800 0.791 1201 
19 18 F8 Geography (see also L8)    0.798 0.775 12131 
20 20 R2 German    0.796 0.769 1519 
21 29 Y1- Combs of groups F and G    0.795 0.807 2411 
22 19 L1 Economics    0.794 0.777 18998 
23 21 R4 Spanish    0.792 0.766 1188 
24 22 V1 History    0.788 0.779 27863 
25 23 V5 History and philosophy of science    0.786 0.658 106 
26 32 B5 Ophthalmics/Audiology    0.782 0.652 3233 
27 27 V7 Philosophy    0.778 0.755 4728 
28 25 Q3 English    0.776 0.767 35315 
29 24 J2 Metallurgy    0.775 0.576 117 
30 26 Q4 American studies    0.774 0.752 3814 
31 34 F1 Chemistry    0.768 0.746 18087 
32 37 Y Combs of groups L/M or N and Q/R/T    0.767 0.754 14943 
33 30 T3 Chinese    0.766 0.748 392 
34 40 C3 Zoology    0.764 0.707 4453 
35 35  Y3- Combs of groups Q/R/T and P,V,W or X     0.760 0.759 22423 
36 36 F6 Geology    0.757 0.731 6856 
37 31 F7 Oceanography    0.756 0.668 837 
38 33 G4 Statistics    0.756 0.722 1174 
39 48 F5 Astronomy    0.754 0.669 873 
40 38 R3 Italian    0.753 0.702 547 
41 47 FF Combinations    0.752 0.715 2780 
42 43 H4 Aeronautical engineering    0.751 0.695 5353 
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43 42 T4 Japanese    0.749 0.693 382 
44 39 M1 Politics    0.748 0.747 12196 
45 44 M3 Law    0.748 0.698 52552 
46 41 C8 Psychology (see also L7)    0.747 0.691 30909 
47 46 C5 Microbiology    0.745 0.692 2273 
48 45 VV Combinations    0.743 0.730 3686 
49 53 B1 Anatomy/Physiology    0.743 0.704 5884 
50 49 D8 Agricultural sciences    0.738 0.353 214 
51 50 C1 Biology    0.737 0.687 24260 
52 51 P6 Journalism    0.735 0.637 3041 
53 58 K1 Architecture    0.731 0.690 8350 
54 52 V4 History of art    0.729 0.740 4378 
55 59 Y2- Combs of groups L/M and N    0.724 0.702 12687 
56 64 CC Combinations    0.723 0.665 2406 
57 54 Q1 Linguistics    0.721 0.708 1775 
58 57 Q5 Celtic languages    0.719 0.680 758 
59 61 C6 Molecular Biology/Biophysics    0.718 0.707 779 
60 56 T2 Other European languages    0.718 0.712 3460 
61 67 H3 Mechanical engineering    0.716 0.671 16486 
62 55 F2 Materials science    0.713 0.582 75 
63 65 V6 Archaeology (see also F4)    0.709 0.694 2886 
64 70 H2 Civil engineering    0.709 0.646 9207 
65 60 L6 Anthropology    0.708 0.715 3606 
66 62 F4 Archaeology (see also V6)    0.707 0.553 1535 
67 66 LM Combinations    0.707 0.701 18372 
68 63 N3 Financial management    0.706 0.644 4045 
69 68 R8 Russian    0.704 0.689 382 
70 73  Y1- Combs of groups B,C and D     0.700 0.607 4826 
71 69  Y Combs of groups L/M or N and P,V,W or X     0.697 0.673 26662 
72 78  Y1- Combs of groups B,C,D,F or G and H/J or K     0.695 0.618 5478 
73 77 NN Combinations    0.693 0.577 8127 
74 79 GG Combinations    0.693 0.727 7413 
75 72 P3 Communication studies    0.693 0.662 8103 
76 81 H5 Electrical engineering    0.690 0.546 562 
77 71 G8 Artificial intelligence (see also C8 and H6)    0.689 0.668 579 
78 87 B2 Pharmacology    0.683 0.611 3430 
79 74 T7 African languages    0.683 0.562 115 
80 76 W3 Music    0.681 0.613 14297 
81 86 N4 Accountancy    0.681 0.624 21143 
82 75 J5 Other materials technology    0.681 0.659 1333 
83 80 J8 Biotechnology    0.676 0.620 551 
84 82 C2 Botany    0.674 0.631 238 
85 84 N1 Business management    0.672 0.577 78249 
86 83 Y2 Combined Social Studies    0.667 0.569 2618 
87 96 K4 Town and country planning    0.667 0.651 4617 
88 85  Y3- Combs of groups P,V,W and X     0.665 0.602 5874 
89 93 H7 Production and/or Manufacturing engineering    0.665 0.636 6067 
90 89  Y1- Combs of groups B,C or D and F or G     0.664 0.666 5458 
91 92 V8 Theology and religious studies    0.661 0.645 6207 
92 97 Y Combs of groups F or G and L/M or N    0.661 0.662 14496 
93 99 BB Combinations    0.659 0.560 2727 
94 88 X4 Junior only (upper primary)    0.654 0.574 4688 
95 90 W4 Drama    0.653 0.585 17875 
96 91 Q2 Comparative literature    0.652 0.546 1033 
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97 95 B6 Sports Science    0.652 0.580 16704 
98 106 C9 Other biological sciences    0.652 0.602 2586 
99 94 X6 Junior/middle (upper primary and middle)    0.649 0.450 1059 
100 103 L7 Psychology (see also C8)    0.649 0.572 10305 
101 98 N5 Marketing and market research    0.647 0.602 10168 
102 117 HJ Combinations    0.647 0.580 9363 
103 101 R6 Latin American studies    0.646 0.613 265 
104 102 KK Combinations    0.645 0.432 424 
105 115 B4 Nutrition    0.644 0.576 2073 
106 100 X8 Physical education    0.641 0.521 4800 
107 104  Y Combs of groups F or G with P,Q/R/T,V,W or X     0.639 0.637 6907 
108 105 N2 Operational research    0.635 0.570 254 
109 111 D2 Agriculture    0.634 0.508 7141 
110 116  Y Combs of groups B,C,D,H/J or K and L/M or N     0.632 0.572 17910 
111 123 B9 Other subjects related to medicine-based sciences    0.632 0.573 31138 
112 110 Y Combs of groups B,C,D or H/J or K with P,Q/R/T,V,W or X    0.631 0.584 11576 
113 113 K9 Other architectural studies    0.631 0.606 7 
114 127 K3 Environmental technologies    0.630 0.586 1163 
115 109 F9 Environmental and other physical sciences    0.630 0.603 11591 
116 108 XX Combinations    0.630 0.550 23782 
117 130 J6 Maritime technology    0.630 0.580 1046 
118 122 B8 Radiography    0.630 0.536 4033 
119 128 X5 Primary all ages (upper and lower primary)    0.628 0.537 18040 
120 114 L3 Sociology    0.627 0.601 24788 
121 121 T6 Modern Middle-Eastern languages    0.625 0.563 367 
122 119 PP Combinations    0.624 0.575 3330 
123 107 X2 Nursery and infants (nursery and lower primary)    0.623 0.515 3540 
124 118 D4 Food science    0.623 0.550 1611 
125 131 J9 Other engineering and technologies    0.623 0.540 1489 
126 112 W5 Cinematics    0.620 0.553 8559 
127 125 Y3 Combined Arts    0.618 0.538 8673 
128 126 P4 Media studies    0.616 0.574 9593 
129 129 G5 Computer science    0.615 0.522 58271 
130 139 V9 Other humanities    0.615 0.493 131 
131 132 H6 Electronic engineering    0.612 0.562 12528 
132 120 W1 Fine arts    0.609 0.597 14566 
133 124 X3 Infants only (lower primary)    0.609 0.513 4595 
134 143 Y1 Combined Sciences    0.608 0.573 11806 
135 134 R7 Scandinavian languages    0.608 0.587 166 
136 137 N8 Land and property management    0.605 0.601 3081 
137 133 M9 Other social sciences    0.605 0.541 1589 
138 144  Y4,Y6; Combs of group A with anything; H/J with K     0.601 0.526 37892 
139 138 P2 Information science    0.599 0.509 1382 
140 142 J4 Polymers and textiles    0.597 0.496 2407 
141 141 T5 Asian languages    0.596 0.535 198 
142 140 WW Combinations    0.593 0.536 4969 
143 135 N6 Industrial relations    0.592 0.482 902 
144 136 W2 Design studies    0.589 0.547 42246 
145 149 Q7 Classical Greek    0.588 0.479 8 
146 145 G9 Other mathematical and informatics sciences    0.587 0.492 713 
147 151 T1 Slavonic and East-European languages    0.585 0.494 145 
148 156 H1 General engineering    0.580 0.518 10387 
149 150 G7 Software engineering    0.580 0.491 8683 
150 155 D9 Other agricultural subjects    0.579 0.404 142 
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151 147 J1 Minerals technology    0.579 0.482 467 
152 153 N9 Other business and administrative studies    0.578 0.529 2148 
153 148 L4 Social policy and administration    0.578 0.545 6474 
154 146 W6 Craft    0.578 0.509 1317 
155 152 N7 Institutional management    0.577 0.460 12903 
156 157 B7 Nursing    0.576 0.485 12033 
157 161 D3 Forestry    0.574 0.509 452 
158 165 DD Combinations    0.570 0.432 81 
159 154 P7 Tourism    0.566 0.482 6790 
160 166 P5 Publishing    0.563 0.485 492 
161 158 W9 Other creative arts    0.556 0.500 3407 
162 160 X7 Secondary    0.550 0.457 2972 
163 159 W8 Creative therapies    0.550 0.386 256 
164 164 K2 Building/Construction    0.547 0.480 10222 
165 162 Z unknown other general and combined studies    0.542 0.452 1985 
166 163 G6 Computer systems engineering    0.538 0.468 3919 
167 167 X9 Other topics in education    0.528 0.426 5944 
168 168 J3 Ceramics and glass    0.494 0.360 27 
169 169 P1 Librarianship    0.488 0.396 57 
170 170 L5 Social work    0.433 0.396 9310 
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